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Abstract
We present here a generalization of the work done by Rabin and Ben-Or in [RBO89]. We give
a protocol for multiparty computation which tolerates any Q2 active adversary structure based on the
existence of a broadcast channel, secure communication between each pair of participants, and a monotone
span program with multiplication tolerating the structure. The secrecy achieved is unconditional although
we allow an exponentially small probability of error. This is possible due to a protocol for computing the
product of two values already shared by means of a homomorphic commitment scheme which appeared
originally in [CEvdG87].
Keywords: Multiparty computation, general adversary structures, span programs, verifiable secret
sharing.
1 Introduction
1.1 Multiparty computation
Multiparty computation (MPC) is a cryptographic task that allows a network of participants to emulate any
trusted party protocol. Each player Pi starts with a private input xi. The players run a protocol to compute
some function g(x1, . . . , xn). The result of this function can then be revealed publicly or privately to some
particular player. The protocol is deemed secure if cheating parties can obtain no more information from
running the protocol than they would in the trusted party scenario (in which each player gives xi to some
external trusted party who then computes g and sends the result to all the relevant players). Goldreich,
Micali and Wigderson proved that to accomplish MPC it is sufficient to always have the value of g revealed
publicly and to assume that g is given by an arithmetic circuit (i.e. addition and multiplication gates) from
Kn to K where K is some finite field.
The first general solution to this problem was given in [GMW87]. They present a protocol for MPC
which is secure under the assumptions that trapdoor one-way permutation exists, that the participants
are restricted to probabilistic polynomial time (computationally bounded) and that the number of cheating
parties is bounded above by t where t < n/2. In the situation where the participants can only cheat passively
(i.e. by eavesdropping) they can remove the last assumption. In [BOGW88] and [CCD88], the assumption of
computational boundedness is removed and replaced by the assumption that each pair of players is connected
by an authenticated secure channel. In this (non-computational) model they prove that MPC is possible
with active adversaries if and only if t < n/3 and with passive adveraries if and only if t < n/2.
These results were extended in [RBO89] to the scenario in which a reliable broadcast channel is also
available. In that case active and passive cheaters can be tolerated if and only if t < n/2. However, to attain
these bounds an exponentially small probability of error was introduced.
The result of [RBO89] was first extended to more general adversary structures by Hirt and Maurer in
[HM97]. However, maintaining an exponentially small probability of error entailed a superpolynomial loss
of efficiency.
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We present a more efficient version of an extension of the [RBO89] protocol using monotone span pro-
grams, following the ideas of [CDM98] 1. The relevant definitions as well as a precise statement of our results
are presented in the remainder of this section.
1.2 Adversary structures and monotone functions
Given a set of players P , an adversary structure A over P is a set of subsets of players which is downward-
closed under inclusion:
(B ∈ A and B′ ⊆ B) =⇒ B′ ∈ A.
Normally such a structure is used to represent the collection of all coalitions of players which a given protocol
can tolerate without losing security: as long as the set of cheating players is in A, the cheaters cannot breach
the security of the protocol.
Classically, protocols such as those of [RBO89] have tolerated threshold structures, which are of the form
A = {B ⊆ P : |B| ≤ t} for some t. However, [HM97] extends several of these results to more general
structures, using the following definition:
Definition 1 An adversary structure A over P is said to be Qk if no k sets in A add up to the whole set
P , that is
6 ∃B1, B2, . . . , Bk ∈ A : B1 ∪B2 ∪ · · · ∪Bk = P.
Hirt and Maurer ([HM97]) extended the results of [BOGW88, RBO89] (see section 1.1) which held for
t < n/3 and t < n/2 to Q3 and Q2 structures respectively.
1.2.1 Monotone functions
Definition 2 For a partial order ≤ on sets A and B, we say that a function f : A → B is monotone if
for x, y ∈ A we have
x ≤ y =⇒ f(x) ≤ f(y)
We can define a partial order on {0, 1}n by the rule “x ≤ y iff each coordinate of x is smaller than the
corresponding coordinate of y.” Then a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotone if
x ≤ y =⇒ f(x) ≤ f(y).
By identifying {0, 1}n with ℘({1, . . . , n}), the relation ≤ on {0, 1}n corresponds to inclusion (⊆) in
℘({1, . . . , n}). Then a monotone function f corresponds to a function from ℘({1, . . . , n}) to {0, 1} such that
A ⊆ B =⇒ f(A) ≤ f(B).
A monotone function f naturally defines an adversary structure Af = {B ⊆ P : f(B) = 0}.
Given an adversary structure A and a monotone function f , we say f rejects A if f(B) = 0 for all B ∈ A,
that is if A ⊆ Af .
With these definitions in hand we can state the complexity of the Hirt-Maurer protocols: their general-
ization of [RBO89] runs in time mO(log logm), where m is the size of the smallest monotone formula consisting
of majority-accepting gates which rejects the adversary structure A.
1.3 Monotone span programs
Span programs were introduced as a model of computation in [KW93]. They were first used as a tool for
multiparty computation by Cramer, Damg˚ard and Maurer [CDM98]. In this section we define the concepts
related to monotone span programs relevant to this paper.
Definition 3 A monotone span program (MSP) over a set P is a triple (K,M,ψ) where K is a finite
field, M is a d× e matrix over K and ψ : {1, . . . , d} → P is a surjective function.
1Results similar to those in this article have been found independently in [CDD+]
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The MSP associates to each subset B ⊆ P a subset of the rows of M : the set of rows l such that
ψ(l) ∈ B. This corresponds to a linear subspace of Ke (the span of those rows). The monotone function
f : ℘(P ) → {0, 1} defined by a MSP is given by the rule f(B) = 1 if and only if the “target vector”
ǫ = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) is in the subspace associated with B. If we denote by MB the submatrix of M formed of
the rows l such that ψ(l) ∈ B then we get that
f(B) = 1 ⇐⇒ ǫ ∈ Im(MTB ).
Given a MSP computing f , there is a secret sharing scheme which tolerates the corresponding adversary
structure Af . This scheme is explained in section 2.1.
The definition above is sufficient for “secret sharing”-type protocols such as VSS and for multiparty
computations in which multiplication in the field is not necessary. For general MPC, however, we need a
stronger notion.
Definition 4 ((due to [CDM98])) A MSP (K,M,ψ) is said to be with multiplication if there exists a
vector r (called a “recombination vector”) such that
∀b,b′ ∈ Ke : 〈r,Mb ∗Mb′〉 = 〈ǫ,b ∗ b′〉
where ǫ = (1, 0, . . . , 0), 〈·, ·〉 is the standard inner product on Ke and for v = (v1, ..., vd),w = (w1, ..., wd),
we have v ∗w = (v1w1, ..., vdwd).
In [CDM98] it is proved that for any Q2 adversary structure A, one can construct a MSP with multiplica-
tion which rejects A. The MSP can be constructed so it is linear in the size of the smallest majority-accepting
formula rejecting A.
Note that a counting argument shows that not all families of Q2 adversary structures over n players (for
n = 1, 2, . . .) can be rejected by a family of MSP’s with size polynomial in n.
See the open questions in section 6 for further discussion.
1.4 Previous work
This work follows the initiative of Cramer, Damg˚ard and Maurer in [CDM98] for adapting existing threshold
protocols to general adversary structures using monotone span programs. In that paper the results of
[GMW87] and [BOGW88, CCD88] were adapted to Q2 and Q3 structures respectively. We state their
genralization of [BOGW88, CCD88]:
Theorem 1 Let A be a Q3 adversary structure and π some multi-party protocol agreed upon n players.
Let (K,M,ψ) be a MSP with multiplication rejecting A and suppose π can be implemented in s steps with
operations over K.
Then there is a protocol for π tolerating A which is information-theoretically secure and which has com-
plexity polynomial in log|K|, s and the size of M .
1.5 This article
In this paper we adapt the results of [RBO89] to Q2 structures with information-theoretic security. As
mentioned above, this had already been done by Hirt and Maurer in [HM97] without using MSP’s. However,
their protocol ran in time mO(log logm) where m is the size of the smallest monotone formula consisting of
majority-accepting gates which rejects the adversary structure A.
Our protocol on the other hand is polynomial in the size of the smallest MSP with multiplication rejecting
A. Since MSP’s with multiplication are at least as efficient as majority-accepting formulae (proved in
[CDM98]), our protocol is more efficient than the [HM97] construction.
The main results are:
Theorem 2 Let A be a Q2 adversary structure on n players and (K,M,ψ) be a MSP rejecting A. Suppose
a reliable broadcast channel and secure communication between every pair of players is available.
There is a VSS scheme for n players, tolerating A, which has error probability ≤ 2−k and which has
complexity polynomial in log|K|, n, k and the size of M .
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Theorem 3 Let A be a Q2 adversary structure and π some multi-party protocol agreed upon n players.
Let (K,M,ψ) be a MSP with multiplication rejecting A and suppose π can be implemented in s steps with
operations over K. Suppose a reliable broadcast channel and secure communication between every pair of
players is available.
Then there is a protocol for π tolerating A which has error probability ≤ 2−k and which has complexity
polynomial in log|K|, s, n, k and the size of M .
Our protocol follows the construction of [RBO89]. We first present the basic secret sharing scheme using
MSP as well as an information checking protocol. We then give a protocol for weak secret sharing which
we use to build a protocol for verifiable secret sharing. Using these tools we present the protocol for general
MPC. For our protocol to be efficient, we change the product checking protocol of [RBO89] 2. The protocol
we give is polynomial in log |K| whereas that of [RBO89] is Ω(|K|2). We conclude with some open questions.
2 Secret Sharing and Information Checking
2.1 Secret Sharing
Given a MSP (K,M,ψ), we can define a secret sharing scheme which tolerates the adversary structure Af
induced by the MSP (see section 1.3). Recall that M is a d× e matrix over the field K and ψ : {1, . . . , d} →
{1, . . . , n} is an arbitrary function.
Say the dealer has a secret a ∈ K. He extends it to an e-rowed vector by adding random field elements
ρ2, . . . , ρe to make a vector a∗ = (a, ρ2, . . . , ρe). Let α = Ma∗ and let αA denote the elements of α with
indices in A where A ⊆ {1, . . . , d}. Then the dealer gives αl to player Pψ(l). In the end, each Pi receives
αψ−1(i).
From now on this protocol will be referred to as SHARE(D, a) where D is the dealer.
Lemma 4 SHARE is a secret sharing scheme secure against Af . That is, no coalition in Af can learn any
information about the secret but any set of players not in Af can reconstruct it.
Proof: See [CDM98]. ✷
2.2 Information Checking
The protocol in this section is based on [RBO89]. All computations are done over F = GF (3k) where k is
the security parameter. We require that 3k > |K|d. This allows the encoding of any set of shares from the
secret scharing scheme induced by the MSP (K,M,ψ).
We will use in the sequel a Guaranteed Information Checking (GIC) protocol:
Pre: D has already sent INT his secret s ∈ F .
Post: INT is guaranteed that an honest R (D may be dishonest) will always (i.e with very high probability)
accept his value for s. Moreover, no information about s is leaked as long as D and INT are honest.
Protocol: GIC-Generate(D→ INT → R, s)
1. D makes 2k vectors (yi, bi, ci) such that bi ∈R F −{0}, yi ∈R F and ci = s+ biyi. He sends s and
the yi to INT and sends the check vectors (bi, ci) to R.
2. INT picks a random set I ⊆ {1, . . . , 2k} such that |I| = k and broadcasts I.
3. R broadcasts the check vectors (bi, ci) with i ∈ I.
4. D checks whether or not this is indeed what he sent to R. If so, he broadcasts his approval. If
not, he creates a new triple (y, b, c) such that c = s + by and b 6= 0. He sends y to INT and
broadcasts the single check vector (b, c).
2The protocol given here was published in a different context (computational proofs of knowledge) in [CEvdG87]. We
independently “discovered” a slightly different version in 1998.
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5. Based on what he has seen, INT “guesses” whether or not R will now accept his value. If D
approved in the previous step then INT decides “YES” if and only if R’s pairs all agreed with the
values INT possesses. If D disapproved and created a new check vector, INT outputs “YES” if
and only if c = s+ by actually holds.
6. If INT thinks his value will be accepted by (an honest) R he broadcasts his approval. If not,
INT asks D to broadcast s.
Protocol: GIC-Authenticate(INT → R, s).
1. INT sends s along with either {yi : i 6∈ I} or y (depending on what occurred at step 4) to R.
2. R accepts if any one of the yi’s agrees with her corresponding pair (bi, ci), or if y agrees with
(b, c).
Notice that at the end of GIC-Generate, INT is guaranteed (with high probability) that an honest R
will accept his value should he send it to R later on. Also notice that if D and INT are honest, no other
party will gain any information about s (including R).
Lemma 5 The GIC protocols have error probability less than 2−k.
Proof: See [RBO89]. ✷
3 Weak Secret Sharing
This WSS scheme comes (essentially) from [RBO89].
Before describing the protocol note that we will refer to the WSS of a value a, by D, as [a]WD . A similar
VSSed value will be denoted [a]VD and a verifiably shared secret belonging to no particular player will be
written [a]V .
From now on we will always assume that the MSP being used is Q2, that is we assume that the adversary
structure Af induced by the MSP is Q
2.
The WSS scheme is in two parts: the commitment protocol (WSS) and the opening protocol (WSS-
OPEN).
Pre: The dealer D has a secret a ∈ K.
Post: D has shared a such that either
• The shares the honest players hold are consistent with a single value which D can reveal, or
• The shares are inconsistent and D will always be caught and disqualified during the WSS-OPEN
protocol.
Moreover, an honest D will never be disqualified.
Protocol: WSS(D, a)
1. SHARE(D, a)
2. For every i 6= j: GIC-Generate(D→ Pi → Pj , αψ−1(i)).
Notice this protocol guarantees Pi that at some later time he can transmit his share to Pj and she will
be convinced that D indeed gave him αψ−1(i).
Based on this protocol we can define a weakly shared value to be a value a which a dealer D has shared
(not necessarily correctly) such that GIC has been run for every pair (Pi, Pj) with i 6= j.
We now give the opening protocol.
Pre: a is weakly shared by D.
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Post: There is a single value a which D can reveal. All the honest players will output the same value, which
will be either a or null. They will output null only if D has acted dishonestly in sharing or revealing
the secret.
Protocol: WSS-OPEN(D, [a]WD )
1. D broadcasts the vector a∗ he created during the SHARE protocol.
2. Each Pi runs GIC-Authenticate with Pj
(Thus Pj obtains αψ−1(i) if Pi is honest and rejects the value if Pi tries to cheat. In the end, an
honest Pi will have obtained αθ where f(θ) = 1, so he can reconstruct the secret if the shares of
honest players are consistant.)
3. If for any i such that Pj accepted Pi’s value there is an inconsistency (i.e. αψ−1(i) 6= Mψ−1(i)a∗)
then Pj accuses D.
4. If the set of accusers is not in the adversary structure (i.e. f({accusers}) = 1) then D is disqual-
ified. Otherwise his value (that is the first coordinate of a∗) is accepted.
Notice that D’s cooperation is essential to opening the commitment and that if need be, D can open his
WSS only to a single player Pi by having all players send information only to Pi.
Lemma 6 For any MSP whose adversary structure Af is Q
2, the pair of protocols (WSS, WSS-OPEN) is
an Af -secure weak secret sharing scheme with error probability exponentially small in k.
3.1 Linear operations on weakly shared values
It is clear that a WSSed value can be multiplied by any constant λ: each INT multiplies his share by λ and
each R multiplies each of his pairs (b, c) by λ. Denote such a multiplication by [λa]WD ← λ ∗ [a]
W
D .
To add two WSSed values belonging to the same dealer, each player adds his shares of the two secrets to
obtain his share of their sum. Then do GIC-Generate(D→ Pi → Pj , γψ−1(i)) where γ is the vector of shares
of the sum. The result is a WSS of the sum. Denote this by [a+ b]WD ← [a]
W
D + [b]
W
D .
Remark: If D does not commit a properly but does commit b properly, he will be caught as a cheater
if he opens a + b. This yields a simple zero-knowledge proof that a value is correctly committed by WSS.
Have D pick b at random and commit to b and then use the preceding protocol to obtain [a + b]WD . Then
flip a coin and have him either open b or a+ b depending on the outcome. If he was badly comitted to a he
will be caught with probability 1/2. Repeat the protocol k times to get exponentially small probability of
error.
4 Verifiable Secret Sharing
Verifiable secret sharing is a primitive introduced in [CGMA85]. The scheme we give comes essentially from
[RBO89].
Pre: The dealer D has a secret a ∈ K.
Post: D is committed to a unique value which can be efficiently recovered without his help. Moreover, each
player has committed to his share by means of a WSS. The shares of all players at the top (VSS) level
are consistent. The shares of honest players at the lower (WSS) level are consistent.
Protocol: VSS(D, a)
1. SHARE(D, a).
2. For l = 1, .., d do WSS(Pψ(l), αl).
3. For j = 1, .., kn do:
(a) D chooses c(j) ∈R K
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(b) SHARE(D, c(j)) (yielding a random vector c
(j)
∗ and shares γ
(j)
1 , . . . , γ
(j)
d )
(c) For l = 1, .., d do:
• WSS(Pψ(l), γ
(j)
l )
• [γ
(j)
l + αl]
W
Pψ(l)
← [γ
(j)
l ]
W
Pψ(l)
+ [αl]
W
Pψ(l)
4. For j = 1, .., kn do:
(a) P
j mod n flips a coin and broadcasts the result.
(b) Heads: Let
• b = c(j)
• b∗ = c
(j)
∗
• β = γ(j)
Tails: Let
• b = a+ c(j)
• b∗ = a∗ + c
(j)
∗
• β = α+ γ(j)
(c) D broadcasts b∗.
(d) Each Pi checks if βψ−1(i) = Mψ−1(i)b∗. If not, Pi accuses D. D must then broadcast all
information given to Pi, that is αψ−1(i) and γ
(j)
ψ−1(i) for all j. Pi is removed from the VSS
protocol (if D does not broadcast the requested information, he is deemed corrupt).
(e) For l = 1, .., d do WSS-OPEN(Pψ(l), [βl]
W ) (as long as Pψ(l) remains in the protocol).
If Pψ(l) gets caught in WSS-OPEN or if the value he reveals is inconsistent with the b∗
broadcasted by D then he is deemed corrupt and is removed from the protocol. All his shares
of a and of all the c(j) are then broadcasted by D.
5. If the set of participants who are removed from the protocol (at any step) is qualified (i.e. not
in the adversary structure) or if D broadcasts inconsistent information then D is deemed corrupt
and the VSS is considered failed. Otherwise the VSS is deemed a success.
Note that as long as no errors occur in the subprotocols, the only way for D to succeed in passing off
inconsistent shares for a is to correctly guess all the coin flips. Since at least one player is honest at
least k of the coin flips are fair and so the failure probability is below 2−k.
Based on this protocol we can define a verifiably shared value to be a value a such that every player is
committed to his share of a via WSS. Moreover, the shares of all players at the top level must be consistent
as must the shares of honest players at the bottom (WSS) level.
The opening protocol is VSS-OPEN:
Pre: a is a verifiably shared value.
Post: All honest players output a.
Protocol: VSS-OPEN([a]V )
1. Each player opens his WSS to his share of the secret.
2. a is reconstructed from any qualified set of players who opened their WSS succesfully or whose
shares had been broadcast in the VSS protocol.
Notice that no false shares can be contributed since any bad WSS’s would have been detected (with
high probability) in the VSS protocol. Moreover, all honest players will reveal their secret correctly
and so a qualified set of shares is available for reconstruction.
Also notice that D’s participation is not necessary and that the OPEN protocol works for any verifiably
shared secret.
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Lemma 7 For any MSP whose adversary structure Af is Q
2, the pair of protocols (VSS, VSS-OPEN) forms
an Af -secure VSS scheme with error probability exponentially small in k.
This proves theorem 2.
4.1 Linear operations on verifiably shared values
It is possible to perform linear operations on a verifiably shared value by performing the corresponding
operations on the shares (committed to via a WSS). In the case of VSS, it is not necssary that the secrets
being added belong to the same dealer or indeed to anyone at all.
4.2 Converting WSS to VSS
A shared value [a]WD can be converted to [a]
V
D by throwing away the check vector information of the GIC
protocols and considering the WSS as a simple secret sharing. The VSS protocol can then be started from
step 2. The cooperation of the dealer is required for converting his WSS to a VSS.
5 Multi-Party Computation
The protocol for computing a function g(x1, x2, . . . , xn) where xi is the input of Pi follows the basic outline
of [BOGW88, CCD88, RBO89]. Before the computation begins, the players decide on an arithmetic circuit
over K which computes g. Each player commits to his input via a VSS [xi]
V
Pi
. The players then evaluate
the circuit gate by gate to eventually end up with [g(x1, x2, . . . , xn)]
V . This commitment is then opened
publicly.
We already discussed how to achieve a multi-party computation for addition and multiplication by a
constant, so all that is missing now is a multi-party multiplication protocol.
5.1 Checking a product
We start by describing a protocol VSS-CP used by a dealer to prove that three secrets [a]VD, [b]
V
D and [c]
V
D
satisfy ab = c. This protocol replaces the [RBO89] protocol that used the multiplication table of the field K.
The [RBO89] protocol is insufficient since it runs in time Ω(|K|2) whereas we require a protocol polynomial
in log |K|. We require this since it may be that the only polynomial sized MSP’s for a given adversary
structure happen to be over large fields (see open questions in section 6 for further discussion).
The protocol given here appeared in [CEvdG87, BCDP90], for commitments based on the discrete loga-
rithm problem. As it appears here it works for any homomorphic commitment scheme (i.e. one which allows
addition of secrets).
Pre: The dealer has [a]VD, [b]
V
D and [c]
V
D where ab = c.
Post: Every participant, knowing only shares of [a]VD, [b]
V
D and [c]
V
D, will be convinced (with very small
probability of error) that ab = c.
Protocol: VSS-CP(D, [a]VD, [b]
V
D, [c]
V
D)
1. Repeat for j = 1,...,kn,
(a) D chooses b′ ∈R K and computes c
′ = ab′.
(b) D commits himself to b′ and c′ by computing
• [b′]VD ← VSS(D, b
′)
• [c′]VD ← VSS(D, c
′)
(c) The participant Pjmodn flips a coin:
i. If Heads:
• The participants open [b′]VD.
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• They collectively compute [ab′ − c′]VD ← b
′ ∗ [a]VD − [c
′]VD.
• They open this commitment and check it is 0.
ii. If Tails:
• The participants collectively compute and open [b+ b′]VD.
• They collectively compute [a(b + b′)− (c+ c′)]VD ← (b+ b
′) ∗ [a]VD − [c
′]VD − [c]
V
D.
• They open this commitment and check it is 0.
Analysis: If in fact c = ab, the verification in steps 1(c)i and 1(c)ii will always be successful. On the other
hand, if c 6= ab, there are two cases. First, if in fact D chose c′ = ab′, in step 1(c)ii the participants
would find that c + c′ 6= ab + ab′. Second, if c 6= ab but c′ 6= ab′, the verification in step 1(c)i would
fail. The protocol VSS-CP thus provides a proof to each honest player with probability of error less
then 2−k. Moreover this proof is zero-knowledge in that the information revealed is never enough to
reveal any information about c, a or b.
5.2 The Multiplication protocol
This protocol is the multiplication protocol for active adversaries in [CDM98]. It assumes that the MSP
being used has multiplication (see section 1.3 for details).
Pre: We have [u]V , [v]V .
Post: We obtain [uv]V , that is uv is a verifiably shared secret.
Protocol: MULT([u]V , [v]V ) We will denote by µ and ν the vectors that share u and v respectively.
1. For l = 1, .., d do
• [µl]
V
ψ(l) ← [µl]
W
ψ(l)
• [νl]
V
ψ(l) ← [νl]
W
ψ(l)
(see section 4.2 for how to do this).
2. For l = 1, ..., d, do:
• Player Pψ(l) computes ωl := µlνl
• [ωl]
V
ψ(l) ← VSS(Pψ(l), ωl)
• Run VSS-CP(Pψ(l), [µl]
V
ψ(i), [νl]
V
ψ(i), [ωl]
V
ψ(l)),
so as to prove to everybody that his commited value ωl is in fact µlνl.
3. For l = 1, .., d do
• Collectively compute
[uv]V = r1 ∗ [ω1]
V
ψ(1) + · · ·+ rd ∗ [ωd]
V
ψ(d),
where r = (r1, ..., rd) is the recombination vector (this is a simple linear combination and can
be done as in section 4.1).
If at any stage of the computation, a participant is detected as beeing a cheater, he is excluded from
the protocol. The only problem that may arise is in step 1, since the participation of the dealer is
necessary to convert a WSS to a VSS. If this ever happens, we simply reset the protocol to the input
distribution stage, the remaining players open the cheaters’ VSSed inputs and then they restart the
protocol. This will prolong the protocol by a factor of at most n.
Since uv is now a verifiably shared secret, it can be efficiently opened by the honest players using
VSS-OPEN.
Notice the protocol given has no inherent probability of error. Its probability of error is at most the
sum of the error probabilities of its subprotocols. As each of these has error probability exponentially
small in k and is executed polynomially many times, the error probability remains exponentially small
in k.
This completes the proof of theorem 3.
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6 Open questions
1. It has not yet been proven whether MSP’s with multiplication are super-polynomially more efficient
than majority accepting circuits (or formulae) for computing max-Q2 functions3. In [CDM98], a super-
polynomial gap has been proved for general MSP’s (which don’t necessarily have the multiplication
property). An interesting question is to determine how MSP’s with multiplication perform as compared
to MSP’s without multiplication.
One thing which is known is that schemes based on MSP’s with multiplication (or even with strong
multiplication) are at least as efficient as those based on threshold formulae. In particular this implies
that the protocol given here is at least as efficient as the one in [HM97]. This is proved in [CDM98].
2. No results have so far been published which extend threshold results other than [GMW87], [BOGW88],
[CCD88] and [RBO89]. Although it would seem that the ideas from [CDM98] extend more or less
directly to many distributed threshold protocols, this is not the case for asynchronous protocols.
In asynchronous systems, MPC is possible tolerating any active Q3 adversary structure (by extending
results of [Bra87, BKR94]). However, no polynomial-time protocol currently exists. The bottleneck is
a primitive from distributed computing known as Byzantine Agreement (BA). Although an efficient
asynchronous BA protocol exists for threshold structures with t < n/3 (from [CR93]), the proof of
correctness given there does not carry over to general structures.
3. Very few results exist which connect the size of the field used in an MSP to the size of the matrix
M . Although one can pass from K to a subfield with blowup only quadratic in the degree of the
extension [Cra98], it is possible that certain functions have polynomial size MSP’s which work only
over unmanageably large prime fields.
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